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This post endeavors, at a very high level, to discuss how the US/NATO shortcomings against Russia and the so-called West’s geostrategic competitors, are more foundational than most commentators recognize. This is due at least in part to an onslaught of propaganda maintaining long-standing prejudices against Slavs and non-white countries that industrialized after Europe.1
Even so, the seeming cognitive block to admitting Russia prowess is leading to bizarre and self-defeating responses, such as acting as if Russia will agree to a ceasefire or a pause on Ukraine NATO entry (when any discussion of “NATO entry” is a big red flag to the Russians) to US and NATO doubling down. They are insisting they will continue to violate Russia’s red lines by launching more “deep missile strikes” into Russia even after the successful demonstration of Russia’s formidable Oreshnik missile. France authorized the use of its long-range Scalp missiles against undisputed Russian territory after the Oreshink strike.
We’ll discuss a bit below some of accounts of the Oreshink works and why it is so significant (keep in mind I can’t independently verify either the information or the analyses; hopefully we’ll get more detail soon). The West ought to be reacting to the Oreshnik the same way the US did to the 1957 Sputnik launch: that it demonstrated that the US was seriously behind the USSR in key areas of expertise. There was a panicked acceleration of space-related spending as well as a broader push to increase math and sciences education.
But in fact the US and NATO have gotten many proofs of how their capability level is behind and if anything falling further behind, from Russian success in GPS signal-jamming and blocking Starlink to its air-defense prowess to Russia regularly using hypersonic missiles, while the US has only recently had a successful test.2
Now the US is the clear leader in some important weapons categories, such as submarines. But an even bigger from the perspective of capabilities is that the US and its allies seem to be operating from a dated playbook. And this problem appears to be deep seated. This goes beyond the problem identified by many experts early on, that NATO was optimized only for very local defense and for regional wars against insurgent forces (read mainly men in sandals with AK-47s and shoulder-launched missiles), not a peer power. ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities are not simply more important than ever but now drive battlefield operations.
Yet many former military officers have pointed out that the US concept of war remains mired in World War II notions like big arrow attacks. For instance, Andrei Martyanov has discussed how Russian weapons are “net centric” as in they communicate with each other. I believe this goes beyond tanks being able to say, “Here I am!” but sending back battlefield information.
I hope knowledgeable readers can opine, but I wonder if the US has also become complacent due to its satellite and in some cases, radar capabilities (the point of sending the THADD system to Israel was per either Lawrence Wilkerson or Douglas Macgregor not its small stock of missiles but its spectacular radar, which can “see” small objects at extremely long distances). We may be kidding ourselves as to the effectiveness of our current systems versus highly-intensive, multi-perspective surveillance of active battlefields.
Similarly (and I did listen to this clip 2x, so my recounting should be ), after his last visit to Russia, Scott Ritter described a long conversation with a military officer. Ritter’s interlocutor said he bet he knew how Ritter would plan an attack and Ritter obligingly provided the “right” response, as in classic combined arms operation with logistical support, with air strikes first, then air cover for a tank and infantry advance.
The Russia said, “That’s not how we do it.” The first step is to plan the drone map, as in to grid out the area and how to deploy drones to cover the theater of battle. The drones are also the first line of combat: “The drones lead the way.”
Mind you, the Russians can’t regard these as advanced ideas if an officer would casually pass them on to a foreign commentator. Yet Ritter found the information to be novel3
A second issue is that the West has not adapted to the related rise of the importance and power of unmanned weapons, witness the demonstrated impotence against Ansar Allah’s attacks on shipping.
One example is the great summer counteroffensive of 2023. It seemed ludicrous from the outset to think it would get much of anywhere. The West announced its plans well in advance, so Russia has ample time to make its Surovkin line even more robust that it might otherwise have. Russia could see Ukraine forces assembling. Bizarrely, the attack did not include meaningful air cover. Instead, US and NATO planners vested their hopes in idea that Russia troops would run away when the encountered Western weapons.
As readers know, the fight did not get as far as Russia’s first fortified line. Russians mined the tanks and armored vehicle approaches with drones, forcing them (mainly) to follow narrow paths cleared by mine-clearers. Taking out a single vehicle would stop an advance. When the vehicles tried to retreat, they would typically find that Russia had drone-mined their rear. Ukraine adapted by instead moving men in via armored personnel carriers, close to tree lines, and having them advance on foot. That made them vulnerable to drone attacks again, illustrating that Russia had drones in such abundance that it could afford to use them against small groups and even single soldiers.
This encounter should have been seen as a humiliating defeat. Perhaps I missed it, but I have not heard of any come across signs that that has been internalized by NATO or the US, meaning no/not enough of a post mortem much the less recognition of the need for a serious rethink of how the West wages war.
In June 2022, a landmark article published by the Royal United Services Institute, The Return of Industrial Warfare by Alex Vershinin, described how Russia was outproducing the West in artillery and it would take ten years of concerted effort by the West to catch up. Since then, Russia has increased its shell output considerably while Western efforts have floundered.
But even more important than the gap in what the West no doubt likes to see as comparatively crude weaponry is the West’s ever-more dated vision of what war is about. The Oreshnik ought to be a wake-up call but muted reactions suggest otherwise.4 Another sign is a new article in the Financial Times that discusses what Europe would need to do to defend itself without US backing.
What the Oreshnik Signifies
Let’s start in “sentence first, verdict afterward” mode. A reason Western officials are so upset about the Oreshnik is that it shows that Russia (sensibly) restarted work on intermediate range ballistic missiles after Trump exited the INF treaty in 2019, which had disallowed them. One obviously uncomfortable fact is that the fact that this missile is not just “merely hypersonic” but travels at >Mach 10. That means it can hit European targets at double-plus speed and cannot be intercepted.
Russia has been trolling:5
New Oreshnik (Hazel) missile, what we know so far:
– a new weapon, not an upgrade
– high-precision, medium-range, with hypersonic speed
– first used in combat on November 21, 2024, when it struck a Ukrainian defense facility in Dnepropetrovsk
Another important feature is that the missile has MIRV-like capabilities (more expert commentary objects to calling it MIRV) in that the missile can and here did separate into 6 capsules which in turn each delivered 6 warheads, for a total of 36. I have weirdly seen a video that estimates the cost of the Oreshnik at “several million” and depicts that as expensive, when for 36 delivered warheads, even before getting to their impact, seems cheap.
But let’s turn to what seems to be the real showstopper, which is not the impressive flight speed and distance per se but the destructive effect:
Eyewitnesses: “Yuzhmash is gone”
In Ukraine, the SBU has completely classified the consequences of the strike by the “Oreshnik” on the defense plant “Yuzhmash” in Dnepropetrovsk. Despite the blockade in the Kiev media, residents of the city began to say for the first time that… pic.twitter.com/5tRGUbiHgU
As we’ll unpack in a bit, many commentators have seemed to discount the sheer kinetic and heat force of this weapon. We’ll work in a minute from the widely reported fact, supposedly based on estimates using the impact videos, that the missiles hit the ground at hypersonic speed.6 If that is accurate, that represents a vast increase in power.
Consider the old normal. a href=”https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/3m22-zircon-debunking-misconceptions/comments” rel=”nofollow”>Here is a typical recap; I recall Simplicius saying something very similar in an extensive treatment of hypersonic missiles but search is not being sufficiently helpful in tracking it down:
No missile is hypersonic in the terminal phase. The heat generated by lower atmospheric pressure would destroy it before it reached its target. The key to the success of hypersonic speed in the upper atmosphere is the plasma bubble that generates, which makes the missile invisible to radar. By the time it’s on its reentry track and has slowed down (still travelling fast) it’s too late to effectively target.
Now how could Russia have achieved what was heretofore deemed impossible? If the missiles indeed struck the ground at hypersonic speed, it’s due to new alloys to withstand the incredible re-entry heat.
Some have argued that the lack of apparent secondary explosions shows the Oreshnik was not impressive. That’s a misreading because the missiles drove deep into the ground and the great energy was dispersed and did its main damage there. Even so, this longer video shows some secondary blasts:
Even though Black Mountain Analysis concedes that claims about the actual destruction of the Yuzhmash plant vary, the lack of explosions at impact actually confirm the kinetic force of the weapons. From Black Mountain Analysis:
The impact on the target in this missile attack is astonishing. What is also interesting is that there are no visual signs of explosions typical for surface or near-surface detonations. This means the warheads likely penetrated deep into the ground with incredible momentum and hit the underground locations (workshops) with a force as powerful as if they had “detonated.” The kinetic shock wave will likely be enhanced by the instantaneous expansion of the soil moisture when exposed to the high temperatures caused by the warhead and the friction of intrusion into the ground at such depths…..
The missile is unknown, but the effect of its payload is a fascinating subject to cover. The “Oreshnik” missile system has extraordinary characteristics regarding the kinetic hit-to-kill mode. Warheads consist of special metals, and motors can achieve 10-11 Mach for these blocks, turning them into kinetic killers. The logic is simple – the higher the speed, the more energy is delivered. Therefore, this terminal block requires no explosive material but heavy, hard, and high-melting-point metal. At such high speeds, penetration into the target causes massive destruction on impact through the shockwaves, creating a mini-high concentrated localized earthquake. It does not need to hit the target precisely (just in the vicinity), and the sheer energy and momentum transfer will produce such shockwaves that will break the concrete structures deep underground. To do this, a camouflet explosion is developed. A camouflet explosion is an explosion at a relatively great depth, where no visible changes on the ground surface are formed.
The destruction of underground objects occurs when the object is within the fracture zone.
From https://impact.uwo.ca/impact-craters/products-of-impact-crater/
The video below also endorses the notion that the impact speed is ~Mach 10 and provides some views early on of its small launch vehicle:
According to some analysts, the plant and its design bureau are among the most extensive underground military bases, serving as a model for North Korean underground complexes
Even though the French statement authorizing the use of its Scalp missiles means that the significance of Oreshnik has not yet penetrated some of the thicker skulls in the Collective West, perhaps they are telling themselves that Russia does not have others in reserve yet. That is a dangerous bet. However, in a discussion with Daniel Davis, John Mearsheimer pointed out that Russia is winning in Ukraine and just needs to stay the course. Responding to Western provocations will distract from Russia’s larger objectives.
“Just as important,” the [Russian] source says, “the Russian ground offensive in the east will remain slow, patient, maybe for two years more. The priority is on preventing Russian casualties, conserving Russian lives. This is essential once you realize that the [Putin] presidential succession also depends, not only on winning the war on Russian terms, but ensuring the protection of Russian lives.”
And the reason for the Scalp missile barking may be that the Yuzhmash strike directly undercut more ATACMS and Storm Shadow missile salvos. Again from Helmer:
Although satellite images of the plant after Thursday’s attack have not been declassified or published in the open, what is likely is that the bunker stocks of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles being prepared at the plant for launching against Russia were destroyed, along with the factory-floor and machine capacities of the plant to service HIMARS, other rocket and missile firing equipment delivered by the US and NATO states to the Zelensky regime.
Mearsheimer pointed out that if the West again hit pre-2014 Russia, Putin’s druthers would be to mess with the US and its allies out of theater, such as by better arming Ansar Allah. Keep in mind that Western officials (even recently Jake Sullivan) have pointed out that ATACMS (and by extension Storm Shadow and Scalp) strikes will not change the outcome of the conflict. However, Mearsheimer pointed out that if politically-meaningful damage were done, Putin may have to respond to domestic pressure to make a visible and painful counterattack.
The West Does Not Appear to be Adapting to New Realities
Due to this post already being a bit long, we’ll give only cursory treatment to our second topic, that of the Collective West being wedded to an outdated mental model of how to wage war, and that in turn leading to misguided priorities. We will use a new story in the Financial Times, Can Europe defend itself with less American help?, as an object lesson.
We’ll put aside the considerable internal decision-making and coordination issues that NATO faces in the absence of US knocking heads together leadership. Auerlien has described them in gory detail over many posts, with NATO’s Phantom Armies as good one-stop shopping.
One can argue that the Financial Times would not represent the most advanced thinking in NATO, Perhaps that is true. But the Financial Times is fairly well plugged into political orthodoxy and what I call “leading edge conventional wisdom”. So it would seem reasonable to take its account of big priorities and impediments at face value.
One glaring issue is the way, as in the US, procuring and contracting drive the bus. This is an issue that Brian Berletic has repeatedly mentioned that is an impediment to Collective West military effectiveness, that our weapons-making is profit rather than purpose driven. In the EU, there’s an additional level of complexity, as in wrangling over who produces what. We have pointed out that NATO, as an actually administratively very weak and lose alliance, has mainly had inefficient national produced weapons, such as the afore-mentioned UK Storm Shadow versus French Scalp versus German Taurus missiles, and several national flavors of tanks and armored personnel carries, and even reports that 155mm shells are not as well standardized as they ought to be. The article confirms that by citing a McKinsey finding, that the US has 32 types of weapons systems versus 172 for Europe.
But what is striking about the piece is that it emphasizes what one might consider to be conventional warfare and with that, current major weapons categories. Not that that won’t remain important going forward. But there is a bizarre failure to recognize that some currently perceived-to-be-important weapons types are being made less potent or even irrelevant. Larry Johnson has argued that manned aircraft are going the way of the cavalry.
In light of the short discussion at the top of the paramount role of ISR and the increasingly powerful role of drones, this section reads as if Europe aspires to fight yesterday’s war:
And all that is in addition to what Europe would need to do should America withdraw from Nato. In that scenario, the things at the top of any hypothetical “to-do” list are what Edward Stringer, a former British RAF air marshal, calls the “boring stuff”.
“It’s ‘boring war’ — stuff like ammunition stockpiles, transport and logistics — that really matters,” says Stringer, who has written about a possible post-US Nato. “It’s also what almost nobody does properly at scale, except for the US.”
But some of what the US provides to Nato — such as its fleet of C17 cargo planes, which cost $340mn apiece and can carry 75 tonnes of equipment almost 4,500km without refuelling — is all but irreplaceable. US-made F-35s also increasingly sit at the heart of Nato’s combat air power, with more than 500 of the fighter jets expected to operate in Europe by the mid-2030s, IISS estimates.
Contrast this with increasing evidence of these jets being rendered less potent by Russian air defenses. From Simplicius:
Western pundits rejoice that the strike [into Kursk by Storm Shadows] “proves” how F-16s or other platform are able to hit Russia with Western missiles. The problem is, this strike proves—thus far at least—they’re too scared to launch them deep. The fact they targeted something right near the LOC indicates that the Su-24s, Mig-29s, or other carrying platforms (F-16s almost certainly not risked from their far-west Ukraine refuge) were terrified of coming anywhere close to the Russian border, as they would be shot down by S-400 or related systems.
You see, Ukraine’s export variant Storm Shadows are said to go 300km max, which means just to reach the compound in Kursk, the planes likely released the missiles at maximum distance all the way over the Dnieper river, safely out of Russian AD range
Ironically, the reason the command center in Kursk was vulnerable was that Russia was loath to put its S-400 launchers too close to Ukraine, so Western planners do look to have correctly identified an area of coverage weakness.
But the bigger point is this article no where mentions drones (which could allow Europe to leapfrog some of its older and overlapping weapons systems) and barely alludes to air defense, per a passing mention of Patriots:
That includes Germany’s Rheinmetall, Nordic multinational Nammo and MBDA, a European multinational that produces missiles, including Storm Shadows, and which started a $5.5bn joint venture this year with the US’s Raytheon to produce Patriot air defence missiles in Germany.
Patriot systems are widely considered to be inferior to the Russian S-400. Russia is already on to S-500 andS-550 systems. Perhaps I missed it, but I have not read that the Patriot has been upgraded.
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1 One staple is that even articles that concede that Russia is winning in Ukraine still include ritual denigration of the Russian military. A recent example depicting Russia as primitive, even barbaric. From the BBC in Ukraine front could ‘collapse’ as Russia gains accelerate, experts warn:
The losses are compounded by the “meat grinder” approach said to be favoured by Russian commanders – describing the waves of recruits thrown towards Ukrainian positions in a bid to exhaust troops.
2 A related issue is Russia’s success in achieving close coordination of its battlefield forces and its arms manufacture. Russia has been feeding information from combat failures and successes back to weapons makers and has been making adaptations in time frames that are simply impossible in the US contracting process.
3 Ritter’s surprise is credible to me based on many years of competitor interviews. I was the only person at McKinsey to have the nerve to call direct competitors of my client Citibank and then get them to talk to me (not hiding that I was from McKinsey, engaged by a client in their space) and then more competitor interviews in my later life. The usual way to get them to agree was to remind them that they were in charge, they could terminate the talk at any time, and that I was seeking general market information. Inevitably, I would learn at least one item per interview of what the subject really did think was general market information that was new and useful to Citibank.
4 One example is a new, prominent story at the Wall Street Journal: Ukraine Clings to Shrinking Sliver of Russia, Expecting Trump to Push for Peace Talks.
5 Last night, this little RT video came up many times on a Twitter search on “Oreshnik” without even wanting to see it. It seems to have been significantly scrubbed; it took a lot of effort today to find the clip, although stills from it were more abundant.
6 This section admittedly relies heavily on Black Mountain Analysis, but I have seen other accounts make claims similar to his, so for convenience I will again cite this source:
Looking at the time lapse between the light flash and the reentry vehicle (or the warhead) disappear, and combined with the estimated height of the clouds of cc 600 m as per Ukrainian weather report at 02:00 AM. The warhead hit the ground about 0.15 seconds from the break from the clouds. The calculated speed is about 4 km/s or Mach 11.8. Anyone can play with the time by adding or reducing milliseconds but the calculated speed will be in the range of Mach 10+.
